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Abstract
While the consequences of becoming an EU member state for national policies
are usually the core concern of pre-membership debates and of post-accession
assessments, studies on the effects of European integration on the political sys-
tems of the now fifteen member states have so far been less numerous. Among
the new EU members, which are ideal cases for studying domestic accession ef-
fects, Austria is a particularly challenging case regarding top-down impact on
the national political system. A number of specific precautions were taken in or-
der to protect typical features of the national political system (notably the tradi-
tional roles of parliament, Länder and social partners) from being eroded in the
multi-level system.
The basic research question of this article is whether or not these measures were
actually successful. How “sticky” is the EU upon closer inspection, i.e. how per-
vasive are its effects on adverse national structures? Can national measures, even
at the constitutional level, outweigh specific consequences of participating in
Euro-politics? If not, why not? The conclusions distinguish specific Austrian
variables from generalisable ones and discuss the findings in the light of the ex-
isting literature.
Zusammenfassung
Während die Auswirkungen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft auf inhaltliche Aspekte
nationaler Politik zumeist im Mittelpunkt von Beitrittsfolgenabschätzungen ste-
hen, sind Studien über die Folgen der europäischen Integration für die politi-
schen Systeme der fünfzehn Staaten der Europäischen Union noch weniger zahl-
reich. Innerhalb der 1995 beigetretenen Länder, an deren Beispiel man die Effekte
einer Mitgliedschaft besonders gut studieren kann, stellt Österreich den wohl
analytisch spannendsten Fall dar. Es wurde nämlich eine ganze Reihe von Ma ß-
nahmen getroffen, um erwarteten Konsequenzen für traditionelle innerstaatliche
Akteure bzw. Entscheidungsmuster gegenzusteuern. Dies betraf vor allem die
Rolle von Parlament, Bundesländern und Sozialpartnern im politischen System.
Grundlegendes Anliegen des vorliegenden Beitrags war es daher, zu analysieren,
ob sich diese Maßnahmen in der Praxis als zielführend erwiesen haben. Wie
„durchdringend“ sind die Charakteristika der EU im europäischen Mehrebenen-
system, wie stark ist ihr Einfluß auf gewachsene nationale Strukturen? Können
nationale Schritte, selbst auf verfassungsgesetzlicher Ebene, bestimmte Konse-
quenzen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft unterbinden? Wenn nicht, warum? Die Kon-
klusionen unterscheiden österreichspezifische von verallgemeinerungsfähigen
Aspekten und diskutieren die Ergebnisse im Lichte anderer Beiträge.
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Introduction
The consequences of becoming an EU member state for national policies are usu-
ally the core concern not only of pre-membership debates, but also of post-acces-
sion assessments. While studies on the effects of European integration on the po-
litical systems of the now fifteen member states have so far been less numerous
(see also Bergman 1997), they increasingly attract scholarship and attention.
The empirical case under scrutiny in this paper is Austria, which joined the EU by
January 1995.1 The experience of a new member state is particularly enlightening
since the “trickling down” of European patterns can be studied almost as if it
were under laboratory conditions. Actors as well as scientists may detect changes
due to Europeanisation more easily than in other national systems for two good
reasons. First, adaptation happened only recently, so both politicians/bureau-
crats and scientists can tell the difference more easily since the time lag is short.
Second, the changes were much more abrupt than in the original member states.
A given acquis communautaire had to be implemented, which the EU itself had
only developed incrementally. What was enacted in the national systems of the
older EU member states over various decades is now already shaping the political
reality of the recent entrants (with very few temporary exemptions still in place).
This accounts for quite dramatic innovation during a few years only.2 In the
founding states, by contrast, the development from “nation state” to “member
state” (Sbragia 1994) happened incrementally so that the impact was experienced
in rather homeopathic doses. Therefore, effects of EU membership are often hard
to distinguish from impacts of other variables in the overall process of political
change (such as reforms for purely internal reasons or reactions to the interna-
tionalisation of the economy in general). Although control of the dependent and
independent variables is not unproblematic even in the case of the youngest EU
members, it is much more difficult with respect to polities that joined before the
Internal Market Programme or right at the beginning of European integration.
                                                
1 This article draws on two studies of Austrian adaptation to EU membership (Falk-
ner/Müller 1998; Tálos/Falkner 1996) and on a broad array of secondary literature.
Special thanks go to Rita Trattnigg for providing information on very recent devel-
opments in the Austrian parliament, and to Bernhard Kittel, Michael Nentwich,
Susanne K. Schmidt, Emmerich Tálos and Helmut Voelzkow for their various co m-
ments.
2 The European Economic Area (EEA) prepared the accession of Austria, Sweden, and
Finland more on the level of policies than of political processes (the main part of the
policy acquis being accepted before EU membership). It was actually a much debated
shortcoming of the EEA that the EFTA members had no decisive say on the rules
which they, too (at least de facto), had to apply in their territories.
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Among the new EU members, Austria is a particularly challenging case regarding
top-down impact on the national political system. A number of specific precau-
tions were taken in order to protect typical features of the national political sys-
tem from being eroded in the multi-level system. The basic research question of
this article is whether or not these measures were actually successful. How
“sticky” is the EU upon closer inspection, i.e. how pervasive are its effects on ad-
verse national structures? Can national measures, even at the constitutional level,
outweigh specific consequences of participating in Euro-politics? If not, why not?
Answering these questions, with Austria as the case in point here, is not only em-
pirically instructive. Insofar as the results can be generalised, they may further-
more help to shape realistic expectations of the domestic consequences of forth-
coming EU enlargements.
My analysis will proceed along the following lines: Initially, the anticipated ef-
fects on domestic politics as discussed in Austria prior to EU accession will be
outlined (see 1, below). Efforts to secure existing national patterns even under the
condition of EU membership, along with their practical success, will then be
analysed for parliament (2), Länder (3) and social partners (4). The conclusions
will go on to distinguish specific Austrian variables from generalisable ones and
highlight our findings in the light of the existing literature.
1 Anticipation of EU Effects in Austria
During the years preceding the Austrian accession to the EU, there were many
studies on the likely effects of this major step in terms of political innovation. In-
sofar as these analyses included the impact on politics and institutions (i.e. not
just on policies, as was frequently the case), they predicted manifold changes due
to the significant differences between the political system of the EU, on the one
hand, and Austria, on the other (see notably Gerlich/ Neisser 1994). Austria was a
federal state with specific powers still resting with the nine provinces (Länder).
Parliament was (at least formally) the gate-keeper of legislation. The social part-
ners as the representatives of labour and employers, however, were in fact more
influential in many issue areas (on the basic features of the Austrian political
system, see Dachs et al. 1997).
A focal point of these studies was the expectation that the government and the
administration would gain in political weight to the detriment of parliament. This
issue was discussed less in terms of “agency loss” (see Moravcsik 1994) and the
likelihood of parliament’s policy options being misrepresented by the govern-
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ment. Rather, it was framed as a relative loss of competencies for the legislature,
hence in terms of the horizontal distribution of functions (Olsen 1997). The gov-
ernment was to have its action capacity increased via privileged access to EU
decision-making (Gerlich 1994). Since it would regularly interact with the other
governments in the EC Council of Ministers, it would participate in package deals
and the relevant political give-and-take across issue areas – which is in practice
outside the control of other national actors. In the long run, the Austrian govern-
ment could even be expected, as a consequence of its increasingly European in-
volvement, to develop “European” interests in addition to national ones, which
might result in less parallel views of ministers/administration and social part-
ners than hitherto (Gerlich 1994).3 The Austrian parliament, by contrast, would
not only lose its monopoly on passing “Austrian” legislation because of regula-
tive competencies being shifted to the EU level (Neisser 1994; Falkner 1994); in
general, the parliamentary character of the political system,4 in the sense of a de-
cisive say for political representatives who are directly legitimated, would also
suffer, it was feared. This concern corresponded to one major argument in the
debate on the EU’s “democratic deficit”5, i.e. that national ministers in the Coun-
cil (and de facto often bureaucrats in the working groups) are the crucial
decision-makers at the EU level, not a legislature that can be held accountable in
general elections. Although the European Parliament (EP) since Maastricht enjoys
co-decision powers in some areas, it is still involved in a purely consultative
manner on a large number of issues. 6 It is particularly where neither the EP nor
the individual national parliaments can control the making of EU law which is
binding on the Member States (most notably where majority voting is practised
without the EP being a decisive co-legislator) that the “democracy principle” of
the Austrian constitution might be hampered since the law would not be created
by directly legitimated representatives of the citizens.
The most widely discussed and supposedly most “typical” feature of the Aus-
trian political system is the corporatist cooperation of the centralised peak asso-
ciations of labour and management with the state in shaping public policies. A
                                                
3 Only a specific empirical analysis could confirm that such a development has
actually taken place. In the absence of such a study, one can merely point to a few
recent examples of conflicts of interest (Falkner 1998b) without as yet generalising.
4 Understood in a broad sense, including the EU as the “first level” (Jeffery 1997).
5 Clearly, there are also other factors which account, according to various authors, for
such a deficit, notably the lack of openness and transparency of EU-level decision-
making, the absence of direct democratic elements, the fact that Euro-elections are
still second-order elections, where often national issues are decisive, etc. (Abromeit
1998; Føllesdal/Koslowski 1997; Grande 1996a; Nentwich 1998; Weale /Nentwich
1998; Zürn 1996).
6 On the state of EP involvement after Amsterdam, see for example Bieber (1997); Brok
(1997); Falkner /Nentwich (1999); Nickel (1997).
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mainstream in the political science literature perceives corporatism as a two-
dimensional phenomenon. The structural dimension refers to the existence of a
corporatist system of interest groups, i.e. one “in which the constituent units are
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hier-
archically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or li-
censed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational mo-
nopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain con-
trols of their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports”
(Schmitter 1974: 13). The procedural dimension concerns a pattern of policy for-
mation with specific relations between government and organised interest groups
(Lehmbruch 1974), “a mode of policy formation in which formally designated
interest associations are incorporated within the process of authoritative decision-
making and implementation. As such they are officially recognised by the state
not merely as interest intermediaries but as co-responsible ‘partners’ in govern-
ance and social guidance” (Schmitter 1981: 295).
In the Austrian case, both dimensions of corporatism are extremely well-
developed. There are a number of quite hierarchically organised “chambers” (for
business, labour, agriculture etc.), i.e. interest groups set up by Austrian law
where membership is obligatory. The classic social partner institutions in Austria
are thus the Chamber of Business (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich), the Chamber of
Labour (Bundesarbeitskammer), the Conference of Presidents of the Chambers of
Agriculture (PRÄKO) and the encompassing Austrian trade union confederation
(ÖGB). These pillars of “social partnership” cooperate formally (e.g. in a plethora
of working groups) and informally with the other political institutions, on a daily
basis. Although there are (increasing) differences between policy and issue areas,
it is quite common that draft legislation is negotiated between the social partners
and/or the relevant ministry before being “rubber-stamped” in parliament (for
an overview and recent developments see Karlhofer /Tálos 1999).
EU adhesion was not expected to put an end to this pattern of corporatism (or so-
cial partnership7), but to change it in a “substantial and speedy” way (Tàlos
1994: 179; Korinek 1994; Seidel 1989; Wimmer/Mederer 1990). Although it was
clear from the beginning that EC law does not directly impinge on the organisa-
tion of associations and on the structure of the system of interest representation
(Zehetner /Haslinger 1990), impulses for change were expected with regard to
both the fields theoretically open for corporatist policy-making and the proce-
                                                
7 Although some features of the Austrian version of corporatism are country-specific,
notably a basic consensus on macro-economic goals and the multi-dimensionality of
government-interest group relations (see Tálos 1982; Tálos 1985; Tálos/Kittel 1995),
social partnership will be used in this contribution as a synonym for corporatism (as
practised by most authors).
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dural dimension of interest involvement. As a direct effect of membership, the is-
sues prone to joint decision-making by the Austrian social partners and “the
state” would be less numerous since decisions would be shifted to the EU level.
As an indirect effect, pluralist patterns of interest group behaviour at the Euro-
pean level (“lobbying”) were expected to trickle down into the Austrian system.
For the Länder, it was clear that a number of competencies which were still in
their realm would be “Europeanised” or at least severely encroached upon by EU
law. Although the legislative powers of the Austrian Länder were already quite
limited before 1994, EEA and subsequently EU membership eroded them even
more. Traditional competencies of the regions were, for example, in the fields of
country planning, road construction (except Federal routes), the regulation of
property markets (where it was common to discriminate against foreigners when
it came to buying landed property, e.g. in Tyrol) and of some professions (such as
skiing or dancing instructors), the setting of economic incentives (funding), and
wildlife and animal protection (e.g. the conditions of production on animal farms,
the definition of cruelty to animals).
That supranational bodies would in future make decisions on many of these is-
sues (i.e. that the level of decision-making would change from subnational to
supranational) was not the only concern of Austrian Länder politicians and politi-
cal scientists dealing with matters of federalism. Another issue was that the deci-
sion-makers at the supranational level would not be representatives of the Länder,
since there is no co-decision power for the subnational regional entities at the EU
level. A shift of competencies would therefore occur not only from the national to
the European level, but also from regional to federal representatives. Hence the
changes for the Länder brought about by a prospective EU accession implied what
was called a “double erosion effect” (e.g. Dachs 1994: 186 and his further refer-
ences): influence on those matters which until then were regional ones would go
to the national government in the EC Council of Ministers, not to an EC chamber
composed of Länder representatives (which would have been considered as a mi-
nor evil by many). In turn, a reform of the national distribution of competencies
between the central and the regional level was demanded (Dachs 1994). Since the
government conceded that this should happen parallel to EU accession (Weber
1996: 50), it was hoped that a reform of the federal state would come as a positive
side-effect of membership and as a pay-off for the negative consequences for the
Länder.
From the viewpoint of the traditional Austrian “model” of a political system, EU
membership was thus expected to have significant consequences on several basic
features (be it de facto or de jure), i.e. the role of parliament, social partnership and
state-Länder relations. To counterbalance the predicted effects, a number of steps
were taken or attempted (some significant, some rather symbolic).
10 MPIfG Discussion Paper 99/4
2 The Nationalrat
a) Efforts to Preserve National Traditions
Even the constitution was changed to give the directly elected first chamber of the
Austrian parliament extremely far-reaching powers to control the government in
EU affairs. The Austrian model even exceeds the Danish one in this respect
(Morass 1996). Article 23e of the Federal Constitution provides that the National-
rat must be informed in good time about all EU-related projects by the responsi-
ble minister. On projects leading to mandatory law in areas which before would
have needed national legislative scrutiny (this is notably the case when new EC
Directives or Regulations are negotiated), the Nationalrat may issue an opinion
which will bind the Austrian members of government in EU-level negotiations
and votes. The ministers can only ignore such a mandate if there are “compelling
reasons of foreign or integration policy”,8 and after another consultation with the
MPs. Parliamentary scrutiny via negotiation mandates extends beyond legislative
issues in the first pillar of the EU to include, notably, decisions in the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as Justice and Home Affairs.
Where EU projects would lead to changes in the (rather extensive) body of Aus-
trian “constitutional law”,9 departure from a parliamentary opinion is only legal
if the Nationalrat does not impede it after “reasonable delay”.
In March 1996, the chairs and directors of the party delegations in the Nationalrat
were also granted the right to participate and speak in the Austrian Council of
Ministers, where in weekly sessions the national strategy for the EU Council is
discussed. All ministers have to report on EU-related issues and problems which
fall in their domain, including complaints filed with the EC Commission, cases at
the ECJ and topics for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of
Permanent Representatives of the Member States at the EC. This serves the cross-
ministerial coordination10 of EU affairs in Austria, but is only the “tip of the ice-
berg” (see below).
                                                
8 German original: “zwingende außen- und integrationspolitische Gründe”.
9 Austrian “constitutional law” needs a two-thirds majority in the Nationalrat and, if
Länder competencies are at stake, even the assent of the Bundesrat (Article 44
Paragraph 2 of the Austrian Constitution).
10 This is of particular significance since the general responsibility for EU coordination
within the Austrian “grand coalition” government is split between the Federal
Chancellery and the Department of Foreign Affairs, i.e. between the social democrats
and the conservatives. Intragovernmental cooperation in EU affairs was tackled in
two coalition agreements (in 1994 and 1996) and in a statute from 1996 (Müller 1997).
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That the Austrian Nationalrat was granted such far-reaching rights (for an inter-
national comparison see Bergman 1997) must be seen in the light of the debate on
drawing closer to the EC, which had been going on since 1987. All major political
actors had participated in it, and the driving forces had an active interest in
keeping opposition to EU membership low. Issues of democracy and the loss of
competencies to be expected for the Austrian parliament had always been a major
topic. Some compensatory measures were therefore considered essential from the
beginning. In fact, a similar model for parliamentary participation in Euro-level
decisions had already been established for the European Economic Area (EEA) in
1993. If the EC Council laid down a common standpoint on an issue covered by
the EEA which would require changes to Austrian law if it was to be adopted
later in the EEA Council, Austrian constitutional law made provision for the Na-
tionalrat11 to express its agreement or opposition in a resolution. While such
resolutions were not binding on the Austrian minister who would accept such a
measure later in the EEA Council, decisions of the EEA Council that impacted on
Austrian law did require the acceptance of the Nationalrat in any case.
The control rights for the Austrian parliament that were set up for EU member-
ship thus followed an existing path. In fact, both the established practice and the
concerns for broad public legitimacy prior to the membership referendum facili-
tated the reform. In addition, a third framework condition should be mentioned,
too: accession-related constitutional reforms had to be adopted during a period
(1994–96) when the Austrian coalition government did not have the two-thirds
majority needed to adopt laws of constitutional quality in parliament. The SPÖ12
and the ÖVP13 had been in government together since 1987 and held more than
two-thirds of the parliamentary seats during most of that time, but to pass the
changes required for EU membership, they needed the consent of members of the
political opposition (de facto of members of the minor Green and Liberal parties),
who asked for far-reaching parliamentary participation and control.
b) The Nationalrat’s Rights in Practice
Contrary to the expectations of at least some observers (Kaiser 1995: 419), the ac-
tual practice of control over government by the Austrian parliament has not as
yet been a success story. In fact, detailed studies show that parliament is an institu-
tional loser in the integration process despite all constitutional precautions to pro-
                                                
11 And, where Länder competencies were concerned, also the Bundesrat.
12 The Austrian Social Democratic Party.
13 The Christian Democratic Austrian People’s Party.
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tect it.14 The Nationalrat has given binding mandates to Ministers only in very
few cases. During the first year of EU membership (1995) the Nationalrat was
notified of 17,317 EU projects. The Main Committee discussed 100 of them and
issued an opinion on 18. In 1996 and 1997, Parliament received information on
37,624 matters. 106 of them were discussed in the Main Committee, but only 11
opinions were ultimately issued (Müller 1999). By summer 1999, after more than
four years of membership, the total number of binding opinions issued by the
Austrian Nationalrat was only 31. Furthermore, the mandates became increasingly
less detailed over time (see also Luif 1998).
This is, at least to some extent, a reaction to bad experience. The most widely dis-
cussed problematic case concerned an EC Directive on animal transport. The
Nationalrat ruled that the Minister was not to allow any lowering of national
standards. In the end, Austria was outvoted in the EC Council of Ministers with a
solution that was not only below the national standards, but even suboptimal if
compared to another compromise solution under discussion. The Austrian dele-
gation did not vote in favour of the latter because, reportedly, the Nationalrat
could not be reconsulted in time (for details, see e.g. Griller 1995). An amendment
to the Austrian parliament’s rules of procedure in 1996 provided that a standing
committee on European affairs could handle most EU matters. It could even set
up a committee (consisting of only one member per party) to consult on urgent
matters and then report to the President of Parliament. The latter could transmit
this position to the Austrian representative on the EC Council. Despite the new
provisions in the rules of procedure, neither of the two sub-units was as yet set
up by the Nationalrat.
That Austria was outvoted on the animal transport issue further confronted the
parliamentarians with the fact that large parts of EC decision-making cannot be
directly controlled by a national parliament since many decisions are nowadays
taken by majority voting in the Council. If a government is outvoted, the influ-
ence of its national parliament is curtailed, while the resulting EC norms have to
be accepted all the same. Therefore, curing the democratic deficit of the EU uni-
laterally via increased control of the national parliament of one Member State is
not feasible, even in principle. Experiencing this, after having lost approximately
70% of their law-making powers to the EU (Müller 1999), was a harsh lesson for
many Austrian members of parliament – despite the fact that they had known
about it in theory long before accession.
Even in those cases where unanimity requirements theoretically guarantee that a
single national parliament, as the elected representative of its citizens, can impose
                                                
14 This is consistent with the results of the comparative study on the older EC members
carried out by Rometsch and Wessels (1996).
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its views not only on the national government, but also on the Union, members of
the Austrian parliament concede that the volume and intricacies of EU legislation
tend to prevent this in practice.15 The sheer number of legislative acts is too large.
Furthermore, most relevant details are negotiated and de facto decided at the
level of Council working groups, which meet almost permanently. Even if a na-
tional parliament wants to exert control on but a few selected topics, it needs
well-trained personnel and appropriate internal structures. In the Austrian case,
both seem to be lacking. Parliament’s administrative capacities and specialized
staff have not been increased to an extent which would allow it to deal ade-
quately with the multitude of Euro-level decision processes needing to be “con-
trolled”. As mentioned above, it is to this very day the Main Committee of the
Nationalrat which discusses EU matters. Its work load was already heavy before
1995 due to all the national issues on its agenda. Initially it met only every other
week to discuss EU affairs, but recently this has been reduced to only once a
month. This very poor level of activity if compared, say, to the Danish Market
Committee of the Folketing, which is in near-permanent session (Ladrech 1994: 77
with further references), suggests that the legal control powers of the Austrian
Nationalrat are hardly being exercised in everyday politics.
A number of factors account for this development: in particular, the specific kind of
government in office, the government’s and administration’s comparatively bet-
ter access to the EU level combined with its self-interest in not giving Parliament
much of a say, and the design of domestic EU coordination in Austria. The first
aspect is directly connected to the Austrian tradition of “grand coalition” gov-
ernment (i.e. between the two largest parties). The de facto distribution of powers
between the national political institutions in a rather stable coalition of this type
allows for the options of the government to be transmitted to the parliamentary
groups via party loyalty. Even in EU affairs, coalition discipline is expected from
the Members of Parliament belonging to each of the two parties in government. It
has been agreed among the coalition parties that Ministers can only be mandated
by Parliament if both coalition parties agree (Müller 1997). Considering that the
two major parties which compose the Austrian grand coalition government rep-
resent in the Austrian parliament more than a two-thirds majority16, they can
dominate the political agenda not only in terms of policies, but also with regard
to institutional politics. This would certainly be different under a minority gov-
ernment, as is the tradition in Denmark for instance. It might even have been dif-
ferent under a grand coalition with only a smaller majority in the Austrian par-
                                                
15 For more information from extensive interviews with Austrian MPs, see Falkner /
Müller 1998.
16 In September 1999, 71 of the 183 members of parliament were from the SPÖ and 52
from the ÖVP. These two parliamentary groups together thus had 123 members, so
that they had one more vote than a two-thirds majority.
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liament, such as occurred briefly before EU accession. Since individual dissenting
members of the governing parties would have carried proportionally greater
weight, a different dynamic might have originated, which could have made the
Nationalrat more self-confident vis-à-vis the executive. As it is, only the members
of the opposition parties have shown much interest in parliamentary activism in
EU affairs during the 1990s. They have, however, little say in the Nationalrat and
its Main Committee since the two co-governing parties’ power to pass constitu-
tional laws on their own was restored in 1996. It is no surprise, therefore, that the
small Green group in Parliament especially complains that the governing coali-
tion parties block the discussion of relevant EU topics in the Main Committee (see
also Luif 1998: 124).
Confronted with manifold new challenges at the EU level and with heavy time
pressures when crafting a “national standpoint”, the Austrian government has
not considered it desirable in practice to also have to deal with tough parliamen-
tary control. The government’s capacity to negotiate and, if necessary, to change
its view or make concessions is regarded more highly than giving the directly
elected representatives of the citizens much of a say (Falkner/Müller 1998). At
least informally, functional criteria are often mentioned as the reasons why min-
isters, having just become the crucial national players within the EU, have little
interest in seeing their efficiency in handling EU matters jeopardised by a na-
tional parliament whose internal procedures will always be cumbersome.
The administration has no self-interest in a strong Nationalrat in EU affairs, either.
In fact, interviews show that information overload is an active strategy on the
part of bureaucrats to limit the practical influence of the Austrian parliament
(Steiner /Trattnigg 1998). Ministries just shower information on the Members of
Parliament, expecting that they will not have the capacity to single out the crucial
pieces and topics in time. This seems to work in many cases since the issues
picked for parliamentary statements in order to bind the government have so far
– at least from the viewpoint of the bureaucracy – not always been the most im-
portant ones. 17 The way Austrian deputies must be informed on EU matters is in
itself not conducive to allowing for effective influence. Indeed, all EU documents
which the responsible members of government have at their disposal are trans-
mitted. The obligation to inform Parliament is not, however, interpreted to in-
clude specific reports by the Minister, his/her point of view on the issue, or the
                                                
17 Steiner/Trattnigg (1998: 160). In none of the cases in social and environmental policy
under inspection in Falkner /Müller (1998) did the Austrian parliament play a
significant role. In the case of the EC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment,
the Nationalrat’s Main Committee became active only once, and the relevant
document then was three months old and already outdated (Trattnigg 1998).
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preparation of summaries. 18 There are thus significant hurdles to be overcome by
the Austrian Nationalrat in the process of issuing a binding mandate to control
government in EU negotiations.
Finally, parliamentary mandating runs counter to the “normal” practice of EU
coordination in Austria. After all, there is extensive work being done in order to
generate a “national standpoint” – in which Parliament is not involved. EU coor-
dination in Austria is generally managed by a Ministry “in charge” of each spe-
cific EC draft law. Within this governmental department, the person participating
in the relevant Council working group will initially consult with various col-
leagues, interest groups, etc. Inter-ministerial coordination meetings follow on an
ad hoc basis and include representatives of the Länder and the social partners. The
weekly COREPER preparation meeting allows for the final check as to whether a
coherent national position is accepted by the participating actors. It includes
members of relevant Ministries, interest groups, the Länder coordination unit, the
Council of Cities and Municipalities, and the National Bank. The Members of
Parliament, however, come in only at the very end of the coordination line, when
an issue is being presented in the Austrian Council of Ministers. On this occasion,
the representatives of the parliamentary parties have the right to participate and
speak – but by then the national position is usually well designed. In short, while
Austrian EU coordination occurs in a bottom-up way under the auspices of a
Ministry in charge, the control by the Nationalrat over the national position, as
provided for in the Austrian constitution, is designed in a top-down manner,
which fits the general structure rather badly.
3 The Länder
a) Efforts to Preserve National Traditions
It was clear long before Austrian EU membership that the purely consultative
Committee of the Regions would not provide the comparatively powerful Länder
with an influence in Euro-politics commensurate with their domestic role. The
participation of the political sub-units of the Austrian federal state was therefore
regulated in Article 23d of the Austrian Constitution and in a special state-Länder
agreement on the participation of Länder and districts in European integration
                                                
18 This was explained in a circular by the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry
(Trattnigg 1997).
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affairs.19 That the latter stems from 1992, i.e. long before EEA or EU membership,
indicates that attributing special rights was a means of ensuring cooperation by
the Länder in the process of EU rapprochement – an issue in which the Länder were
perceived de facto to have veto power (Dachs 1994: 187). The strategy paid off
since the Assembly of Länder Governors (Landeshauptleutekonferenz) helped in
gathering political legitimacy for the adhesion option during the Austrian mem-
bership negotiations (ibid. and Morass 1996).20
The procedure of Länder involvement in EU affairs resembles that of the National-
rat, but the provinces have less far-reaching rights. The government is obliged to
inform the Länder on all EU-related projects which touch their domestic realm of
autonomy or might otherwise be of interest to them. This is effected by submit-
ting all relevant documents and reports. The Länder may issue opinions on such
EC projects. Their unanimous position in an area of Länder competency under
domestic jurisdiction is binding for the Austrian delegation in Brussels. Absten-
tion is of no consequence, but five out of the nine Länder must vote for any “joint
position”. Only if there are “compelling reasons of foreign or integration policy”
– which is a “legally vague clause”, however (Morass 1997: 80) – the government
may deviate from such positions and justify this within eight weeks.
Another concession to the Länder gained during the pre-accession phase is that
they can directly participate in EU negotiations. If issues within their inner-state
legislative realm are discussed, the government may include a Länder nominee in
the Austrian delegation. This representative may, however, only act in coopera-
tion with the responsible member of the government (see Art. 23d Para. 3 of the
Austrian Constitution).21
With a view to coordinating their EU policies, the Austrian regions set up two
bodies. The “Integration Conference of the Länder” consists of the governors of
the nine Länder (Landeshauptleute) and the Presidents of the regional parliaments,
but only the former are entitled to vote22 (Dachs 1994: 190). In the “Standing Inte-
                                                
19 BGBl No. 775/1992. It is a specific characteristic of Austria that not only the regions,
but even local districts and the municipalities have been given some information and
consultation rights (Morass 1996: 40).
20 On details of the Austrian debate concerning EU adhesion, see most importantly
Schneider (1990); Luif (1995); Schaller (1994); Schaller (1996).
21 This is less far-reaching than, say, the Belgian model, which provides that the federal
state may be represented and committed in the EC Council by a member of a sub-
national government (Kerremans/Beyers 1997: 46).
22 There was a controversial debate on parliamentarism at regional level, specifically on
who should vote in the Integration Conference. In some Länder, the constitutions now
provide for similar consultation and mandating processes of the Landeshauptleute and
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gration Committee of the Länder”, delegated bureaucrats support the Integration
Conference. The formal link with federal EU coordination is established by the
Länder’s liaison office in Vienna (Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer). It gathers
relevant information and transmits the positions agreed in the Integration Con-
ference, but it has no competency for aggregating regional interests. Like other
Austrian institutions such as the National Bank or the Statistical Office, and in
addition to the ministries, the representative of the liaison office may participate
in the weekly jour fixe, where the strategy of the Austrian Permanent Representa-
tive with the EU is coordinated.
Last, but not least, the Austrian Bundesrat may also give opinions on EU-related
topics. This second parliamentary chamber consists of representatives of the
Länder parliaments and usually has only a retarding veto in Austrian legislation.
The government has to take such opinions into due account but is in most cases
not bound by them.23 This is a crucial difference to the German system, where
the position of the Bundesrat is binding on the Federation if no agreement can be
reached with the Federal government (Goetz 1995: 106).
b) The Rights of the Länder in Practice
While the Länder’s institutional self-interests in the multi-level system will usually
be parallel, their interests with regard to EU policies often diverge according to
their specific economic and legal situation (Dachs 1994: 203).24 Since the position
of an agricultural region bordering Hungary tends to diverge from that of a
highly industrialised area neighbouring Germany, unanimity is a tough condi-
tion. As soon as their wishes regarding a “national” position differ, however, the
Austrian Länder cannot encroach on the strategy of the national Minister in the EC
Council. For this reason, unanimous and hence binding opinions of the Länder are
in practice very rare (Morass 1997: 82; Steiner/Trattnigg 1998: 164). If such joint
Länder opinions were adopted during the early years of Austrian EU member-
ship, it was uncontroversial to make them the “national” position because the in-
terests of the federal and the regional level in Austria were usually closer to each
other at the time than they were to the positions of the other member states
(Morass 1996: 41).
                                                                                                                                           
Landtagspräsidenten, as exists between Parliament and government at the federal level
(Dachs 1994: 190).
23 Where EU projects would lead to changes in Austrian constitutional law which
would need the Bundesrat’s assent under domestic rule, departure from an opinion of
the Bundesrat is, however, only legal if there are compelling reasons of foreign and
integration policy.
24 For a similar statement on Germany, see Jeffery (1997: 69).
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In day-to-day practice, the Länder have even more difficulty in keeping up to date
with EU negotiations than Parliament. The deadlines and time pressures of Euro-
politics impinge on the Länder even more than on actors at the federal level. The
geographical distance accounts for the comparatively greater difficulties in
reaching joint opinions. Intricate bureaucratic procedures have to be followed in
nine different locations when drafting a regional viewpoint, then all nine posi-
tions should ideally be aggregated despite often divergent interests. In urgent
matters, the Länder’s liaison office in Vienna thus frequently communicates nine
different opinions (Steiner 1998: 54). These may counteract each other in the proc-
ess of drafting a single “national” position. Instead of having the inflexible liaison
office participate in national EU coordination, the Länder have meanwhile started
nominating specific Länder representatives for specific EU-related issues. They
usually come from two different regional governments and try to represent the
interests of all Länder during the elaboration of an Austrian standpoint (Steiner /
Trattnigg 1998: 164). In any case, the Austrian position is usually already worked
out by the time the Länder representative(s) participates in the weekly jour fixe,
where the strategy of the Austrian Permanent Representative with the EU is co-
ordinated. By contrast, the earlier coordination meetings (which are more impor-
tant in practice) are organised by the Ministry responsible for the specific act, and
the attitudes of the single departments with regard to inviting experts and repre-
sentatives of institutions differ a lot (for details see Karlhofer/ Tálos 1996: 147–9).
Although Länder representatives may be included in the Austrian national dele-
gation to the EC Council when matters within their inner-state legislative realm
are discussed, this has been very rare so far (Morass 1997: 84). It used to be prac-
tised in informal meetings of the Council of Country Planning Ministers. In day-
to-day politics, the Austrian government claims that it may legitimately represent
Austrian national interests in their full range at the European level (Weber 1996),
including the interests of the Länder.25 The latter have accepted this for practical
reasons: If their position on a matter is unanimous, there is usually no problem in
having it represented by the government as the “Austrian” position. If their posi-
tions differ, they cannot present a single voice in the EU Council.
A significant setback for Austrian federalism is that the planned reform of the
Bundesstaat, which was intended to counterbalance losses of the Länder in the
multi-level political system of the EU, was never adopted. According to a “politi-
                                                
25 It should be noted that, during the early phase of membership, complaints were
voiced that the federal government used its tactical advantages at the EU level to the
detriment of the Länder: E.g., the Austrian membership fees to the EC were collected
from the Länder much earlier than they were actually passed on; payment to the
Länder of EU regional development funding from the EU, in turn, was delayed by the
government (Weber 1996: 61–62).
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cal agreement on the reform of the federal state” signed by the Federal Chancellor
and the chairman of the Landeshauptleutekonferenz (Conference of the Länder Gov-
ernors) in 1992, innovations should have focused on the following: distribution of
competencies between federal, regional and local level; creation of coherent clus-
ters of competency for the Länder; reinforcement of their constitutional autonomy;
possible strengthening of Länder powers with respect to EU affairs; and reforms
of the Bundesrat as well as of the budgetary distribution between the various state
levels (Dachs 1994: 192). The agreement stated that the reform should be com-
pleted not just before EU adhesion, but even before the Austrian referendum on
membership.
However, this was not the case. A draft law, agreed upon only after some delay
in the constitutional committee of the Austrian Nationalrat, fell far short of the
initial stakes (for details, see Weber 1996: 56–57). Most notably, there were no co-
herent fields of Länder competency delineated. Rather, the overall distribution of
competencies between the federal and the regional level of government would
have made the situation even more of a maze. In addition, the unpredictable fi-
nancial costs of various aspects of the envisaged reform (above all, the setting up
of Regional Administrative Courts) made the Länder reluctant to press ahead. Fi-
nally, without prior consultations the federal government initiated some new
amendments to the draft which would have been to the detriment of the regions.
The Bundesländer then preferred no reform of the Austrian federal state as the
lesser evil – at a time when their political support for EU accession had already
played its part as hoped for by those campaigning for membership.
4 The Social Partners
a) Efforts to Preserve National Traditions
To get the Austrian electorate to vote for EU membership, the agreement of the
crucial Austrian interest groups was de facto at least as indispensable as the
agreement of the Länder.26 Since the major interest groups feared that “significant
parts” of their powers in national policy-making would be transferred to Brussels
(Sozialpartnerstellungnahme 1989: 157, translation by the author), Austria tried to
                                                
26 The fact that the groups representing labour opted for accession at a very early stage
of the debate (against large sections of their own rank-and-file) was a crucial
development. For a long time the constituency of the Chamber of Commerce was
more sceptical than its official representatives, too (Austrian companies being
predominantly small or medium-sized).
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counterbalance this, too (for a detailed overview see Karlhofer/Tálos 1996). As
early as 1989, a party agreement between SPÖ and ÖVP promised that the long-
standing practice of social partner participation in the shaping of Austrian social
and economic conditions would be upheld even during EU membership.
The 1994 “Europe Agreement” between the Austrian coalition parties allocated
specific participation rights at the European and the domestic levels to the four
social partner institutions. These major associations were even promised “equal”
participation in the various EU decision-making bodies and committees.27 To
guarantee social partner influence in the domestic decision-making process on
EU-related matters, the right of the chambers of business and of labour to be con-
sulted on national legislative projects proposed by the government was extended
to EU issues. It was an innovation in the Austrian system of social partnership
that even the two associations based on private law (the trade union confedera-
tion ÖGB and the agriculturally based PRÄKO) were legally granted consultation
rights. The four classic social partner associations must not only be informed on
all EU-related legislative projects, but also given proper time to issue opinions.
They are furthermore members of the External Economic Policy Committee,28
which consults the Economic Ministry on EU-related issues. During the prepara-
tion of Austrian EU positions, the social partner associations participate in rele-
vant meetings, which are organised at the sub-ministerial, departmental and
cross-ministerial levels (see Kittel /Tálos 1999 in detail).
b) The Social Partners’ Rights in Practice
Soon after the Austrian adhesion, the government qualified its concession that the
social partners could participate in the Austrian delegations to EU decision-
making bodies on an equal footing. It argued that, according to EU rules, only
government representatives are officially part of national delegations. For special
cases, the responsible Minister nevertheless agreed to include social partner rep-
resentatives in the national delegation, although without the right to speak (Karl-
hofer/Tálos 1996: 141). This did not come as a surprise to those familiar with EU
law and practice.29 In any case, the direct participation in the EC Council of eco-
                                                
27 “[G]leichberechtigte Teilnahme an der österreichischen Entscheidungsvorbereitung
und Entscheidungsfindung im Rahmen der EU” (pt. 13a).
28 The other members are the federal ministries and the National Bank (Karlhofer /
Tálos 1996: 142)
29 In theory, the issue could have been dealt with somewhat more in line with the 1994
“Europe Agreement” if so desired. One option would have been to provide that both
official and unofficial parts of the Austrian Council delegation need to agree on
votes. In practice, however, it is hard to see how divergent special interests within
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nomic interest representations has de facto been a secondary factor only. The
main reason is a practical one: sitting in meetings of the Council or its working
groups can provide access to some interesting information and the chance to
monitor the actual behaviour of the Austrian government, but it is very expensive
in terms of resources. Therefore, the social partner organisations attend such fo-
rums very selectively and only in their core areas of interest (Falkner/ Müller
1998).
Nevertheless, the social partners seem very satisfied when asked about their role
in the shaping of Austrian positions for the EU Council during the early years of
EU membership (Karlhofer/Tálos 1996: 143; Eder/Hiller 1998). However, there
are differences between policy areas (indirectly mentioned in Karlhofer/ Tálos
1996: 143) which have recently increased (Kittel/Tálos 1999), social affairs being
the field with best practice from the economic interest groups’ point of view. In
other policy areas, they are not equally satisfied with their role in national EU co-
ordination. The finance ministry is known to consult very infrequently (Karlhofer
/Tálos 1996: 145). In the field of agriculture, there were recently complaints that
unilateral steering increasingly replaces more cooperative patterns. 30 In the light
of the concessions prior to EU accession, it is important to note that consultation
(as granted by law to the Austrian social partner institutions) does not yet guar-
antee that interest group positions are actually incorporated into the Austrian
“national position”. In principle, the same is true for consultative rights in na-
tional politics, but the multi-level system brings in more competing interests.
Furthermore, surveying the national representatives’ behaviour and following up
one’s own positions is de facto more difficult and time-consuming abroad. It is in
keeping with domestically established traditions that, according to interviews,
the problem of not only acquiring a voice but having an impact is comparatively
more relevant in policy areas where corporatism had not been the prevailing
mode even before EU adhesion (such as in environmental policy; Steiner/
Trattnigg 1998).
Potential indirect effects in the sense of a trickling down of pluralist patterns of
interest politics from the EU level are much more difficult to assess, at least in the
short run, than the practice of incorporating interest groups in the making of EU-
related decisions. What is evident, at least, is that in the core area of Austrian so-
cial partnership (i.e. labour law and labour market policy31), the corporatist pat-
                                                                                                                                           
the delegation could have been overcome fast enough to avoid immobilising the
Austrian delegation and harming its role in the Council negotiations.
30 Thanks to Emmerich Tálos for this information.
31 It should be mentioned here that Austrian social partnership is less uniformly
characterised by interest group co-decision in public policy-making than was often
assumed. In areas such as judicial policy, education, research policy, consumer
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terns were not affected by the entry in the European multi-level system since a
similar policy-making style was recently developed under the Maastricht Social
Policy Agreement (which was incorporated in the EC Treaty at Amsterdam);
Falkner 1998a).32 It is therefore no surprise that Austrian social partnership was
able to maintain its grip in this core field. With regard to national EU coordina-
tion, the participation of the social partners has so far worked out very well, fa-
voured by the fact that the Ministry of Social Affairs has been used to corporatist
policy concertation for a long time (in addition, the current minister comes from a
strong union background, which usually has been a central qualification for this
post in Austria).
Finally, it should be mentioned that the social partners were once again privi-
leged during the preparation of Austrian EU adhesion. Other interest groups
were neither guaranteed supply of information (which is an important resource
for the social partners) nor consultative rights. It is thus no surprise that envi-
ronmental groups, for example, now claim to have an even harder life than before
EU accession (Steiner/Trattnigg 1998). It seems that what Beate Kohler-Koch con-
cluded for the regions also holds true for interest groups: Europeanisation offers
manifold additional opportunities for all national actors, but only the ones with
adequate resources can actually seize them. In the Austrian case, it was the al-
ready dominant interest groups who became comparatively stronger again, i.e.
the traditional “social partners”. Even they, however, have to (re-)focus now on
the most immediate interests of their clientele. Dispersing their activities would
not be much use under the over-crowded conditions of Euro-politics (Richardson
1996). This might, in the long run, reinforce the already existing trend towards a
sectoralisation of national interest-politics that was recently acknowledged even
for the corporatist “role model case” of Austria (Kittel/ Tálos 1999; Kittel 2000).
                                                                                                                                           
protection, defence policy and telecommunications, the influence of the Austrian
social partners is at best marginal (Kittel/Tálos 1999: 118f.). In fact, corporatist
patterns are dominant in a few core policies only (i.e. in social, economic and
agricultural policies). Even there, they do not characterise all issue areas and,
certainly, not each and every specific decision process.
32 For a comparison of the effects of EU membership on Austrian policy networks in the
environmental versus social policy fields, see (Falkner et al. 1999). With regard to
other areas, additional studies are needed which should compare the specific policy
network at the EU level with the one pre-existing at the national level and study
possible feedback mechanisms (Falkner 1999).
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5 Conclusions
Since membership in the EU was expected to have a rather strong impact on the
traditional Austrian model of politics, the basic institutions of the national politi-
cal system which were expected to lose out under the conditions of Euro-politics
(notably Parliament, the Länder and the social partners) were accorded special
rights in EU-related decision-making. Existing domestic structures thus had a de-
cisive influence on the legal reforms – and even some constitutional ones – which
aimed at counterbalancing the effects of Europeanisation in Austria (Luif
1998: 119). Both Parliament and the Länder were empowered to formulate bar-
gaining mandates for the Austrian minister in the EC Council. The social partners
were granted a privileged flow of information as well as participation at both the
domestic and the European levels of decision-making in economic and social
matters. In political practice, however, the characteristics of Euro-politics proved
to be quite resistant to this national counterbalancing, even if the latter was per-
formed at the constitutional level.
What kinds of factors account for this? In the light of the more general hypothesis
that European integration impacts not only on national policies but also on na-
tional politics, the important question is whether the conditions leading to this
outcome were country-specific or general in character. It seems that both kinds of
factors were at work in the Austrian case. Country-specific conditions are, first,
the design of the co-decision powers for non-governmental actors involved in EU-
level decisions and in intra-Austrian EU-related policy making. One example is
that the Länder have to adopt unanimous viewpoints if they want to mandate the
government which represents Austria in the EU Council of Ministers. A second
“homemade” factor is the specific political framework conditions under which the
participation mechanisms as designed in (constitutional) law have historically
been put into practice. The stable “grand coalition” government since 1987 plays
a major role here, as does the consensual culture of Austria’s political system
(which in real terms always meant a consensus between the Social Democrats, the
People’s Party and their related social partner organisations). Since 1996, when
the SPÖ and the ÖVP even regained the two-thirds majority needed for the
adoption of constitutional law, the opposition has de facto had very little say in
Parliament. Members of the governing coalition, in turn, are subjected to the
Austrian tradition of coalition discipline. Since defection is costly, the govern-
ment leaders can usually impose their views on party affiliates in Parliament.
National factors have thus clearly mattered in the application of the Austrian
“counterbalancing measures” in day-to-day politics since EU accession.
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In addition, general features of the multi-level system also contribute to the fact that
Europe “sticks” more than some had thought prior to Austrian membership.
Most prominently, the executive-based decision model at the EU level cannot be
outweighed unilaterally in (present or future) member states, although at least
four instruments are available in principle. First, there are EU-level representa-
tion rights, which can only be vested on subnational governments since Article
203 ECT provides that each member state must be represented in the council by a
minister. This may be a member of a regional government (as Belgium desired),
though this minister must still be authorised to commit the entire member state.
Only the minister may vote on the Council. If a minister cannot attend, his/ her
place may be taken by a civil servant who cannot vote. Only a Council member in
the strict sense can vote or act on behalf of another minister (Art. 9.3 of the Coun-
cil rules of procedure, OJ L/99 147/13). Second, participation rights in Council
meetings may be granted not only to civil servants, but also to representatives of
private interests. 33 They are then part of a national Council delegation, although
they cannot speak or vote. Third, control rights can be established. According to
EU law, however, members of the Council commit their member state (even in
cases where his/her vote might not have conformed to the government’s posi-
tion). Nevertheless, member states may try to bind the representative on the
Council, in national law, to opinions issued by domestic actors such as parlia-
ments or regions.34 Finally, a fourth national option for counterbalancing the
executive-oriented bias of Euro-politics is to allow for participation in domestic
EU-related decision-making.
The Austrian case, where all but the very first forms of countersteering were ap-
plied, indicates that, at the moment of EU membership, the national executives
still become the predominant decision-makers at the European “first level” (i.e.
the EU; Jeffery 1997) and that they have a self-interest in being flexible (i.e. not
tightly controlled) in Council negotiations. In fact, all potential measures allow
for quite limited counterbalancing only. As outlined above, some legal factors re-
strict the individual member state’s leeway (e.g. the EC Council’s rules of proce-
dure providing for votes by ministers only, or the fact that governments may
nowadays be outvoted on most decisions). Experience in Austria suggests, how-
ever, that they are less significant in overall terms than such practical issues as
                                                
33 In practice, the term “officials” is interpreted in a wide sense since Article 4.4 of the
Council rules of procedure provides that members of the Council “may be
accompanied by officials who assist them”. The Council may lay down the number
of such officials, but meetings restricted to only the ministers are also possible (ibid.).
34 This will usually be sufficient since the political career of a minister is decided at the
national level as well. However, monitoring is in fact often difficult to manage from
the domestic level since viable and timely information on the other delegations’
options is rarely available.
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scarce resources (most notably in the case of interest groups), coordination prob-
lems (in particular for regions) and overcrowded agendas (e.g. for national par-
liaments). Such problems are crucial enough in national politics, but their salience
increases when second-level actors (i.e. national ones) get involved in first-level
issues on top of their domestic responsibilities. Similarly, deliberative institutions
(e.g. Parliaments) and institutions with unanimity requirements (e.g. the sum of
Austrian regions if they want to bind the central government) are, in each politi-
cal system, at a disadvantage compared to hierarchical actors in terms of decision
speed. This is, once again, aggravated under the conditions of the European
multi-level system, characterised by increased time pressures as well as by multi-
plied interests and procedures.
Even if, in a given future EU member state, the domestic conditions might be
more favourable for day-to-day control of the national Ministers in the EU Coun-
cil,35 the character of Euro-politics will tend to strengthen the government and
the administration compared to other national actors (on the so-called “strength
of weakness”, see Kohler-Koch 1995; Grande 1996b). Whether this is considered a
welcome escape from “agency capture” (i.e. from a situation where, say, eco-
nomic interest groups can dominate any national reforms) or rather an “agency
loss” (in the sense that the governments gain too much autonomy from their Par-
liament and electorate) is largely a matter of perspective. In Austria, more auton-
omy for the government tends to be welcomed in the case of the relationship
between the government and the social partners, given that the latter were par-
ticularly powerful in the past and, since the mid-1980s, often perceived as a hin-
drance to structural reforms. At the same time, increased de facto powers for the
executive tend to be criticised in Austria where Parliament is concerned, whose
influence in political practice was often meagre even before “Europeanisation”.
This study confirms earlier insights, relating to other member states, that Euro-
pean integration impacts on federalism, parliamentarism and public-private rela-
tions.36 Where a detailed analysis of the effects of European integration on national
institutions is concerned37, however, the Austrian case suggests that it is essential
                                                
35 For example if there are minority governments, no culture of “coalition discipline”,
no unanimity requirements for mandates by the regions.
36 See for example Goetz (1995); Ladrech (1994); Börzel (1999); Rometsch/Wessels
(1996); Schmidt (1999a, 1999b, 1997; 1996).
37 It should be pointed out that this research question goes beyond the issue of
“convergence” (on the latter, see particularly Rometsch/Wessels 1996: 357 ff.).
Federalism may serve as an example since a convergence towards the German model
of  cooperative regionalism was recently detected among the federal EU member
states (Börzel 1999). That the present end point of developments in a number of
domestic systems is similar (e.g. cooperation in the intra-state process of EU-related
policy-making) does not mean that the impact of Euro-politics is the same
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to employ a rather ambitious research design. It reveals the crucial importance of
differentiating between policy areas, between the theory and practice of national
provisions, and finally between different pre-existing national models in the
analysis of Europeanisation and national politics.
The importance of the meso level is most striking as regards the impact of Europe-
anisation on national patterns of public-private interaction in policy-making. It is
useful, but not enough, to differentiate according to more statist, pluralist or cor-
poratist member states. Even in the case of the so-called corporatist role model,
Austria, public-private relations differ from area to area. Further sectoralisation is
promoted by the great differences in interest politics prevailing at the EU level.
While many fields are characterised by lobbying of diverse small interest groups
(e.g. environmental policy), some fields have outright statist character with no
significant role for private interests at all (e.g. monetary policy). Finally, the
Maastricht Treaty established a corporatist policy community for social policy
where a few privileged interest groups are co-actors in public decision-making
(Falkner 1998a). It is thus reasonable to no longer expect similar signals to trickle
down from the European “first level” across the various policy fields. Whatever
influence comes top-down will, furthermore, meet varying conditions in different
areas, even within the same member state. Hence, no simple general statements
on adaptational dynamics can be ventured.38
The potentially great contrast between law and practice is best underlined by the
application of control rights over government in EU affairs. Studying the formal
setup and the legal rules of various national European Affairs Committees and
scrutiny processes (e.g. Bergman 1997) remains without doubt an interesting aca-
demic endeavour. However, only work that includes the day-to-day application
of such formal rules will bear results of immediate relevance. Austria is a case in
point, demonstrating that far-reaching parliamentary powers do not necessarily
mean tight control in practice, and anyone examining only the national constitu-
tional provisions to that effect will be misguided.
Another lesson from the Austrian case is that the impact of European integration
on the regional actors depends on the model of federalism in a specific member
state. It may be a generalisable fact that “EC inputs may provide additional con-
duits of resources and political legitimacy for subnational actors” in unitary states
                                                                                                                                           
everywhere. The diagnosis of impact needs to take into account possible different
starting points. Since the pre-existing model of federalism differs between Austria
and Germany, the effects of Europeanisation would not be the same even if the result
was an identical one.
38 As I have outlined elsewhere, the probable long-term result might be more intra-state
divergence in interest intermediation patterns parallel to less inter-state differences
within the EU (Falkner 1999).
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(Ladrech 1994: 85). The effect of EU membership on federal states is, nevertheless,
not necessarily uniform. Rather, it depends on the specific federal-regional rela-
tionship within the state, as the comparison between Austria and Germany indi-
cates.
Klaus Goetz has convincingly argued that European integration has actually rein-
forced several of the key principles of German federalism (Goetz 1995). That the
Austrian case deviates from this is mainly due to the different national model.
Austrian federalism is less characterised by the sharing of powers and responsi-
bilities than the German version.39 Therefore, the rest of legislative competencies
remaining with the Länder matters more, and the shift of policy-making powers to
the EU level has been a more painful loss to the Austrian Länder. When it comes
to EU decision-making, the Austrian government can nevertheless always act
against an opinion of the Bundesrat and even against a unanimous view of the
Länder (which is rare), as long as there are some “compelling reasons of foreign or
integration policy”. In Germany, it is the Bundesrat which can impose its view if
no agreement is reached with the federal government (Goetz 1995: 106). The
background to this represents another difference in the two models of federalism,
since the second parliamentary chambers in the two countries also have a differ-
ent setup. In Germany, the regional governments send representatives to the
Bundesrat. In Austria, it is the regional parliaments who are represented at the na-
tional level.
The dominance of the executives in the domestic intergovernmental process is
indeed another crucial difference with respect to the impact of Europeanisation
on national federalism in Germany and Austria. It represents a traditional pattern
in Germany, 40 but a rather new one in Austria. Here it was controversial that the
regional governors’ unanimous position has to be taken into due account by the
government (not the Länder parliaments’ or at least the Länder parliament presi-
dents’ position). In the end, however, the proponents of an executive-based solu-
tion had good functional arguments since only timely input in EU decision proc-
esses makes sense. Contemporary politics in the European multi-level system
clearly do not favour deliberative decision processes in the constituent units.
Rather, centralisation and hierarchy are appropriate means of assuring that re-
gional inputs stand a chance of being taken into consideration. Decision speed
                                                
39 Approval by the Bundesrat of federal laws is necessary in the majority of cases in
Germany (Goetz 1995: 95); usually none of the levels can impose its views (and
unanimity is frequently the rule in decision-taking). In Austria, the Bundesrat is rarely
important (basically only when the distribution of competencies between the layers
of the state is at stake) and it usually has only a retarding veto in the legislative
process.
40 Germany is the only country where the regional governments actually have a direct
say in federal law-making (Scharpf 1999: 3).
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 99/4
will be higher if the small group of nine governors has control rights over na-
tional EU positions than if nine regional parliaments need to come to a unani-
mous decision. This was in the end accepted by the parliamentarians in the Aus-
trian regions. It stands to reason that such efficiency considerations will often
work as functional imperatives in the multi-level system.
Taking these results into account, it seems essential for forthcoming studies of the
effects of Europeanisation on national politics not to over-generalise, but rather to
explore further empirical cases both in detail and in practice. Four issues should
be distinguished and each studied empirically: first, the typical features of the
national system under inspection; second, the impact on the national system
emanating from the EU (or rather the direction of reform incentives stemming
from the supranational level); third, institutional adaptations at the member state
level, which may seek to counterbalance effects of EU adhesion; finally, the actual
effects of Europeanisation in day-to-day politics. As in the Austrian case, empiri-
cal studies taking into account all of these features might reveal that the specifics
of Euro-politics are more pervasive than one would conclude from only consid-
ering a selection, but that the effects of Europeanisation on particular domestic
systems are less uniform than otherwise expected.41
                                                
41 This might hold true even in cases where convergence towards similar institutional
solutions exists (Börzel 1999), as the comparison of German and Austrian state-
Länder cooperation indicates.
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